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FAITH WITHOUT BELIEF?
Louis Pojrnan

For many religious people there is a problem of doubting various credal statements
contained in their religions. Often propositional beliefs are looked upon as necessary
conditions for salvation. This causes great anxiety in doubters and raises the question of
the importance of belief in religion and in life in general. It is a question that has been
neglected in philosophy of religion and theology. In this paper I shall explore the question
of the importance of belief as a religious attitude and suggest that there is at least one
other attitude which may be adequate for religious faith even in the absence of belief.

It is worth noting, by way of conclusion, that the mature believer, the
mature theist, does not typically accept belief in God tentatively, or
hypothetically, or until something better comes along. Nor, I think,
does he accept it as a conclusion from other things he believes; he
accepts it as basic, as a part of the foundations of his noetic structure.
The mature theist commits himself to belief in God; this means that he
accepts belief in God as basic (Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God
Rational ?"). 1

Entombed in a secure prison, thinking our situation quite hopeless, we
may find unutterable joy in the information that there is, after all, the
slimmest possibility of escape. Hope provides comfort, and hope does
not always require probability. But we must believe that what we hope
for is at least possible (Gretchen Weirob in John Perry's A Dialogue
on Personal Identity and Immortality) 2

For many religious people there is a problem of doubting various credal
statements contained in their religions. Often propositional beliefs are looked
upon as a necessary, though not sufficient condition, for salvation. This causes
great anxiety in doubters and raises the question of the importance of belief in
religion and in life in general. It is a question that has been neglected in philosophy
of religion and Christian theology. In this paper I shall explore the question of
the importance of belief as a religious attitude and suggest that there is at least
one other attitude which may be adequate for religious faith even in the absence
of belief, that attitude being hope. I shall develop a concept of faith as hope as
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an alternative to the usual notion that makes propositional belief that God exists
a necessary condition for faith, as Plantinga implies in the quotation above.
Finally, I shall deal with objections to this position as set forth by Gary Gutting
in his recent book, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism. For simplicity's
sake I shall concentrate on the most important proposition in Western religious
creeds, that which states that God exists (defined broadly as a benevolent,
supreme Being, who is responsible for the creation of the universe), but the
analysis could be applied mutatis mutandis to many other important propositions
in religion (e.g., the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity).
Many reflective religious people find themselves at one time or another
doubting God's existence. If they have studied the alleged proofs for God's
existence, they may become convinced that these "proofs" do not work as probative but, at best, simply point to the possibility of an intelligent force that
influences the universe. For many ofthese people God's existence is not self-evident, nor is it properly basic for them. They are troubled by the lack of evidence
for God's existence and believe that the move made by some philosophers to
set it into the foundations of one's noetic structure is not acceptable for them.
Their prayer is, "God, if you exist, show me better evidence." Although they
would like to believe with confidence that God exists and are tempted to take
the Pascalian-lamesian line of acquiring this belief by getting themselves into a
context where viewing selective evidence will cause belief, they resist this temptation as unethical. They adhere to an ethics of belief that prevents them from
manipulating their noetic structure in such ways as to cause a belief that the
evidence alone does not warrant. Such a maneuver would constitute a breach in
their concern for having the best justified beliefs, a concern that puts a high
premium on impartial regard for evidence. They also have the prudential concern
of worrying about the possible bad effect such belief manipulations might have
on their belief-forming mechanisms. It may even be that some of these doubters
have tried but failed to get themselves to believe by using auto-suggestion or
getting themselves into a favorable context as Pascal suggests.
I. The Importance of Belief

Being unable to believe either because of the lack of evidence or because of
moral compunctions against acquiring beliefs through volitional means, these
people have the unwelcome prospect of being denied the benefits of religious
faith altogether or, at least, of being designated "immature theists," since faith
with belief is generally regarded by orthodoxy as the sole manner of being a
genuine believer with the benefits of salvation. The question immediately arises,
What is so important about believing anyway? May there not be other propositional attitudes that are equally as effective as believing or, at least, adequate
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for the essential benefits of religion?
The traditional virtues of the attitude of belief have been (1) its ability to give
intellectual and emotional surcease to the pain and insecurity of doubt and (2)
its action-guiding function. Both of these virtues are ably discussed in C. S.
Peirce's essay "The Fixation of Belief." According to Peirce, doubt is a type of
pain, which, as such, is necessary as a warning mechanism to make us aware
of the need for evidence. It is, like all pain, undesirable in itself, and a state
from which we seek release. "Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from
which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the
latter is a calm and satisfying state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change
to a belief in anything else. One the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely
to believing, but to believing just what we [already] believe. "3
Furthermore, argues Peirce, beliefs are action guides, directing our desires
and shaping our actions. It is important to arrive at beliefs, because unless we
do so, we cannot act. Beliefs are necessary conditions for actions. Let us look
a little closer at these two theses.
Turning to the first thesis, why is belief restful or relief-ful, whereas doubt is
anxiety ridden and stressful? Perhaps it is because in many cases, unless we
have a conviction, we cannot act with abandon and singlemindedness. If we
doubt our course, the doubt may deflect us from our goal. The runner who
believes the prize to be uncertain may flag in his zeal. Furthermore, there may
seem to be something unstable and unreliable about a doubter. The doubter, who
wavers in his beliefs, "is like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and
tossed ... A double minded man is unstable in all his ways" (Epistle of James
1:6, 8). One cannot imagine, the objection continues, a lover who doubts the
beloved, a guerrilla fighter who doubts his cause, a successful businessman who
doubts the free enterprise system, a skillful gambler who doubts his luck or a
successful musician who wonders about her talent while performing. Doubt is
the hobgoblin against every successful venture.
Contrast the d01Jbter with the "mature believer," who confidently asserts, "I
know whom I have believeth," or "The testimony of the Spirit is superior to all
reason .... [It] is an undeniable truth, that they who have been inwardly taught
by the Spirit feel an entire acquiescence in the Scripture, and that it is self-authenticating, carrying with it its own evidence, and ought not to be made the subject
of demonstration and argument from reason ... We feel the firmest conviction that
we hold an invincible truth.'" Such absolute confidence certainly does offer a
pleasant feeling of security, as well as a sense of rest from the further search
for truth on this issue.
But, while doubt may be painful, it may be a wholesome suffering that causes
us to recheck our propositional states, which may lead to greater accuracy and
approximation of the truth. It is true that the runner who doubts may flag in
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zeal, but it is equally true that doubt may deflect him from the wrong course.
In any case, we can learn to live gracefully with necessary pain, and it may be
necessary for many religious people to learn to live gracefully with doubt, using
it to probe deeper into ultimate questions. The suffering of doubt may be a cross
that a disciple must learn to bear.
Turning to Peirce's second reason for having beliefs, i.e., that they are actionguiding, we can agree that this is an important aspect of fixing a belief. However,
we need not agree with him that a belief is a necessary condition for action; at
least it is not necessary to believe that a proposition is true in order to act on it.
For many actions belief that the state of affairs in question will occur is not a
necessary condition. I may act on the mere possibility of something being the
case without actually believing that it will be the case. I can believe that a
hypothesis is the best among a series of weak hypotheses and worth following
through without believing that it is true. I can believe that it is worthwhile to
bet on a horse that is underrated at 10 to 1 odds, when I have only $10 and need
$100 soon and have no other way of getting it. I can bet on the horse, risk
everything on it and still not believe that it will win. I only need to believe that
it is a worthwhile action to bet in this way, given my overall set of goals and
beliefs about reaching these goals. Likewise, I can attempt to swim five miles
to shore after my ship has sunk, in hope of reaching the shore, without believing
that I can or will reach the shore safely. Finally, Columbus' sailors need not
have believed that the earth was round in order to have embarked from Spain
to sail to the New World. They simply had to believe that the risk was worth
taking.
When the evidence is perceived as weak, too weak to produce belief in the
veracious person, and where the ethics of belief forbids mind manipulations or
acquiring beliefs volitionally, but where the consequences are great, the best a
person can do is live belief-lessly according to the hypothesis in question. That
is, we may be justified in doing a cost-benefit analysis in order to determine
whether the proposition is worth following for the possible consequences. For
example, I may have two incompatible goals at some moment and need to decide
which one to aim at. Suppose that I determine that goal A has a probability
index of 0.4, whereas goal B has one of 0.6, making it positively probable.
Although B has a better chance of being reached than A, I might still be justified
in aiming at goal A rather than B. I would be justified in doing so just in case
I desired A sufficiently more than B-if, for example, I give A a preference
value of 0.7 and B only a value of 0.4. Of course, we usually do not give exact
quantified indices and preference values to possible courses of action, but we
do make rough approximations of this type very often. When a graduate student
accepts a challenging job with a questionable future over a more secure job with
less challenge, a decision process has often gone on which has weighed subjective
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probabilities and strengths of desires. If I believe that there is only slight chance
that there is a bomb in the briefcase on the other side of the room, I do not need
to make a formal cost-benefit assessment of the matter in order to act swiftly.
I leave the room because the stakes are very high, even though I may not be
convinced that there really is a bomb in the briefcase. It seems that our sub-conscious is constantly making rough cost-benefit assessments in the various situations in which we find ourselves, maximizing expected utility. 5
If my analysis is correct, positively believing in the existence of objects in
question may not be as important as we have sometimes been led to suppose.
We may be guided by weak probabilities, and the distressing doubt that we feel
may often be redemptive, causing us to check our evidence, justify our beliefs,
and obtain more accurate beliefs.
II. Faith as Hope

We have argued that it is not necessary to believe that a proposition is positively
probable in order to act on it. The perception of its possibility is often sufficient
to incite activity. One such alternative propositional attitude to belief is hope
(or, negatively, fear). In the next section (A) I shall examine the concept of
hope. In Section B I shall compare it with its close relatives: 'belief-in,' 'trust,'
'living-as-if' and 'optimism.' Then, in Part III of this paper I shall apply the
analysis of hope to religious faith, showing that faith need not be belief-ful, but
may be an expression of hope. 6
A. An Analysis of Hope

Let us begin with some examples of expressions of hope.
I. Mary hopes to get an A in her History course.
2. John hopes that Mary will marry him.
3. Mary hopes that Happy Dancer will win the Kentucky Derby next week.
4. John hopes that the Yankees won their game yesterday.
5. Mary hopes that the sun is shining in Dallas today for her sister's wedding.
6. Although John desires a cigarette, he hopes that he will not give in to his
desire.
If we look closely at these examples of hoping, we can pick out certain necessary
features of the concept of hope. First of all, hope involves belief in the possibility
of a state of affairs obtaining. We cannot hope for what we believe to be
impossible. If Mary hopes to get an A in History, she must believe that it is
possible that she get one in that course, and if she hopes that Happy Dancer will
win the Kentucky Derby, we must believe that it is possible that he will win.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'hope' as an 'expectation of something
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desired,' but this seems too strong. Expectation implies belief that something
will occur, but we may hope even when we do not expect the object of desire
to obtain, as when John hopes that Mary will marry him but realizes that the
odds are greatly against it or when Mary hopes that Happy Dancer will win the
Kentucky Derby although she accepts the official odds against it. I may likewise
hope to win a lottery but not expect to do so. Belief that the object of desire
will obtain is not necessary for hope. It is enough that the hoper believe that the
proposition in question is not impossible. What separates hope from belief is
that in believing one necessarily believes that the proposition is true (has a
subjective probability index of greater than .5), whereas in hoping this is not
necessary. 7
Secondly, hope precludes certainty. John will not be certain that Mary will
marry him or that the Yankees won the game yesterday. There must be an
apparent possibility of the states of affairs not obtaining. We would think it odd
to say, "John knows that the Yankees won the game yesterday, for he was at
the game, but he still hopes that the Yankees won the game yesterday. "For
hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for"
(Epistle to the Romans 8:24). Hope entails uncertainty, a subjective probability
index greater than 0 but less than 1.
Thirdly, hope entails desire for the state of affairs in question to obtain or the
proposition to be true. In all of the above cases a propositional content can be
seen as the object of desire. The state of affairs envisaged evokes a pro-attitude.
The subject wants some proposition p to be true. It matters not whether the state
of affairs is past (case 4), present (cases 5 and 6) or future (cases 1-3), though
it generally turns out-because of the role hope plays in goal orientation-that
the state of affairs will be a future situation.
Hope is to be distinguished from its near relatives, other pro-attitudes, especially from wishing. In wishing for something one need not even believe that it
is possible. Mary can wish that she had never been born but she cannot hope
this. I may wish I were smarter than I am, but I cannot now hope that. After
John discovers that the Yankees lost the game yesterday, he may wish that his
favorite team had won, but he can no longer hope for it. Furthermore, we can
wish for possible things which we are not ready to do anything about because
the cost benefit analysis shows that the possible benefit is not worth the risk
involved. I might wish to make an extra $100 this week, but I may conclude
that the loss of my free time in working overtime is not worth the extra money.
Here I cannot be said to hope to make the extra $100, though I might wish that
it were somehow possible to have the requisite extra time to do so.
This brings us to our fourth characteristic of hope. If one hopes for p, one
will be disposed to do what one can to bring p about, if there is anything that
one can do to bring it about. In hoping, unlike wishing, there will be a tendency
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to try to bring about the state of affairs if there is anything that can be done to
bring it about. In the examples above cases 1, 2 and 6 are situations where the
hoper can make a difference, whereas there is nothing he or she can do to bring
about the desired result in cases 3 through 5. In this, hoping seems more reflective
than wishing or merely having a desire. It is closer to having a want-on-balance,
having considered the alternatives, as in case 6, where John has three desires
but only one hope. (I) He wants to smoke. (2) He wants to stop smoking, and
(3) he has a second order desire, in that he wants his second desire to win out
over his first. He will try to bring it about that he will be successful in this. In
this case it would be odd for John to speak of two hopes, that of having a
cigarette and that of not smoking. John's full-blooded hope is to lick the habit,
beginning by refraining from taking the cigarette.
In this sense hoping (where something can be done to bring about the state
of affairs) is similar to intending where the agent desires that some state of affairs
obtain and will try to bring it about. The difference between this dimension of
hope and intending is that in intending to do action A one must believe that one
will succeed, whereas no such requirement is necessary in hoping. If I intend
to get an A in History, I must believe that I will, but I may hope to get an A
without believing that I will be successful. 8 hope stands mid way between wishing
and intending. In the former category, I may not believe that p is possible and
in the latter, I must believe that I will probably bring it about. In hope I must
believe that it is possible, but I need not believe that I will be able to bring it about.
A more difficult question is whether one can have incompatible hopes. Muyskens, in his important study The Sufficiency of Hope, follows Aquinas in denying
that we can have conflicting preferences on balance. We may have conflicting
wishes but not hopes.
If S hopes for p. either S prefers p on balance or S believes that he
does not prefer anything that opposes his desire for p. The following
formulation of this necessary condition is most perspicuous: It is not
the case that p is not preferred by S on balance, or that S believes that
q, which he prefers on balance, is incompatible with p (p. 18).
But why can't we have incompatible hopes, even as we have incompatible
desires? It may not be rational to have them, but we are not talking about justified
hopes, simply about having hopes. Can I not hope to travel to Greece this summer
and also hope to finish my manuscript, which I can only do if I stay home from
Greece? Perhaps the full analysis of this state is something like the following.
I desire both to go to Greece and to finish my manuscript, but since there are
many other contingencies that may prevent either of these from happening (e.g.,
I may have to teach summer school in order to earn some money or go in for
an operation, either of which will prevent me from realizing either of my desires
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about going to Greece or finishing my manuscript) or prevent one of these from
happening (e.g., I may not have enough money to go to Greece, or I may have
my contract cancelled and so lose my motivation for writing my manuscript), I
may be said to have a disjunctive hope: I hope either to go to Greece this summer
or write my manuscript. It would be odd to say, under these circumstances, "I
hope both to write the manuscript and go to Greece this summer, but I know
that I cannot do both."
There may be a tendency to emphasize the desiderative aspect of hope and
maintain that incompatible hopes are possible, as incompatible desires are.
Hoping does not entail belief, but a mere pro-attitude. 1 cannot believe that p
and q where they are incompatible (and I realize it), but I can desire both.
Because hope does not necessitate belief, it may seem that we cannot rule out
the possibility of incompatible hopes. However, the key phrase here is 'desiring
on balance,' which connotes a more reflective or intentional stance. If hope is
closely allied to intention, as I have argued, it would seem to rule out incompatible
hopes in the sense that if someone realizes that he hopes for two separate states
of affairs, he must give up one in order to try to bring about the other. It seems
to me that this attitude carries over to situations where one is powerless to affect
the outcome. Mary may unreflectively hope that Happy Dancer wins the race
and that Slippery Heels wins the same race, but when she realizes that these
horses are running in the same race, she must give up one of her hopes or at
least hope something like the following: that either Happy Dancer or Slippery
Heels will win, or, if Happy Dancer does not win, that Slippery Heels will.
It may be objected that we can have incompatible hopes but that they are vain,
ill-advised, foolish or whatever. This seems to call for a normative notion of
hoping, separating rational hopes from irrational ones; where hopes are incompatible at least one hope is irrational. Mary may believe that she hopes to get
an A in History but also hope to go to a party on the two nights preceding the
exam. We want to say that such hope is irrational or imprudent. Mary should
realize that it is virtually impossible for her to get an A in history without studying
the two nights before the exam. If Mary were more rational, she would reflect
on her incompatible hopes and decide on one of these hopes to the exclusion of
the other. If hope is made up of a desiderative and an estimative factor, we may
call hope unjustified or irrational just in case we can call either of its components
unjustified or irrational. If John hopes to square the circle, we want to say that
since the belief in question is irrational, the hope is also. If Mary hopes to party
instead of studying, but has long term goals which entail good grades, which in
tum entail studying instead of partying, then we can speak of Mary having
irrational hopes.
It may be countered that what is irrational about Mary is not her hoping but
her believing that there is a chance of getting an A without studying. Or we may
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say that Mary really doesn't hope to get an A. She is self-deceived about her
attitude and really only wishes to get the A. If hope has the intentional dimension
that I have argued for, either of these redescriptions of Mary's state seem preferable to saying that Mary has consciously incompatible, though irrational, hopes.
The issue is difficult, but I am inclined to hold to the irrational/rational distinction
regarding hoping. Since hoping has an estimative (doxastic) and desiderative
component, if one of these is irrational, the whole (i .e., the hope itself) may be
irrational. At the very least we can say that a hope is irrational if the agent
should know that the object in question is either certain or impossible. If John
hopes he is God or Mary hopes to be forgiven by John after John has made it
clear that he has freely forgiven her, their hopes are irrational. There is also the
phenomenon of something being so close to impossible or certain that hoping
may be irrational, as when an average person hopes to live to 200 or an average
high school football player with no great promise hopes to make the pros and
gives up all else in order to do this.9
If we can apply the rational-irrational distinction to hopes, can we also speak
of morally unjustified and justified hopes? Are there moral constraints to hoping?
Day denies, but Muyskens affirms, that there are such. 10 We may have morally
unacceptable hopes in a way that we cannot have immoral beliefs. This is because
hope statements involve desire in a way that beliefs do not. Consider the difference
between:
I. I believe that the US and the USSR will annihilate the world in a nuclear war.

and
2. I hope that the US and the USSR will annihilate the world in a nuclear war.
Beliefs may be formed through a culpable lack of attention and thus have a
moral dimension, but the belief itself cannot be judged moral or immoral. Hopes
can. Having certain hopes, like having certain desires, shows bad character in
a more fundamental way than belief acquisition does. But the most important
difference is that the belief may be evidential and justified while the affective
state of hoping is still inappropriate. We ought not allow ourselves to give in to
such malicious desires.
B. Hope and Other Propositional Attitudes
We have argued that hoping need not involve a subject's actually believing a
proposition, but only that the proposition could be or could become true. In
believing a proposition, the doxastic state has a subjective probability index of
greater than 0.5, but in hoping that p is true, one need not believe that the
proposition has that high an index." John need not believe that Mary will marry
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him in order to hope that she will, nor need he believe that the Yankees have
won the baseball game in order to hope that they have.
But if hoping does not entail belief-that so-and-so is the case, does it, at least,
entail belief-in, a relationship of trust? Believing-in or trusting is a relational
attitude. 'S trusts X' or'S trusts in X' or'S believes in X' indicates a sense of
dependency and willingness to run a risk (however small) because of the positive
valuation on the object in question. Some instances of hope do entail believing-in
the object of hope. Consider case 3 (Mary hopes that Happy Dancer will win
the Kentucky Derby next week). What would it mean to day that Mary believed-in
Happy Dancer in this context? She must act or be disposed to act in some way
as to manifest trust in Happy Dancer. She may bet on Happy Dancer without
believing that he will win the race, but she cannot hope that Happy Dancer will
win the race without being inclined to take some action in appropriate circumstances. The most likely action would be to bet on Happy Dancer, if she is
able to do so, and the degree to which she hopes in Happy Dancer may be to
some degree measured by how much she would bet on Happy Dancer. Of course,
she may not bet on Happy Dancer, just in case her desire is sufficiently weak,
or she has compunctions against gambling, or her estimation of Happy Dancer's
chances are too low to warrant a risk. We can weakly hope (all things considered)
without acting when there are countervailing desires (e.g., the desire not to risk
one's hard earned money on a long shot). There is a fine line where our desire
for something ceases to be a weak hope (with some inclination to act) and
becomes a mere wish.
Although because of the desiderative nature of hope, there will be some
inclination or tendency for the subject to believe-in or trust the object of hope,
but there are cases where there is nothing one can do (e.g., when I hope that
the Yankees won their game yesterday or that the sun will shine in Dallas today
for my sister's wedding) or where the hope is so weak that it is easily overridden
by other considerations (e.g., when I hedge my bet, when I hope the sun will
shine but take an umbrella or hope to live a long life but take out an expensive
life insurance policy or hope that the enemy will not attack but keep my powder
dry).

Here we need to make a distinction between ordinary hope or weak hope and
a deep hope. Consider Mary's situation as she hopes in Happy Dancer. She may
only believe that Happy Dancer has a 1 in 10 chance of winning the Kentucky
Derby, but she may judge this to be significantly better than the official odds
of 100 to 1 against him. Suppose that she has only $10 but wants desperately
to enter a special professional training program next week which will cost $1000.
She has no hope of getting the money elsewhere but sees that if she wins on
Happy Dancer, she will get the required amount. Since she believes that the real
odds are better than the official odds and that winning will enable her to get into
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the training program, she bets her $10 on the horse. She both hopes and trusts
in Happy Dancer, though she never really believes that he will win. We might
call these cases where one is disposed to risk something significant on the
possibility of the proposition's being or becoming true 'deep' or 'profound hope'
and cases where the person hopes against belief, against the available evidence
and is even ready to risk something significant 'desperate hope.' Desperate hope
is a species of deep or profound hope. In all cases of profound hope hoping
entails trusting in the object of hope. There are rational and irrational, moral
and immoral profound hopes. A morally acceptable, rational, profound, desperate
hope is exemplified by a version of William James's classical mountain climber,
who cannot believe but only hopes that he will be successful in jumping across
the gorge. 12
Sometimes it is thought that belief-in statements entail existential belief-that
statements. That is, belief-in some object x presupposes that one believe-that x
exists or will exist. \3 But this seems to be incorrect. The object need not be
realizable, nor need the subject believe that he will realize it. All that is necessary
is that the individual believe that there is some possibility of realizing it. A
scientist may risk his reputation and spend enormous time and energy on a
hypothesis that involves the possible existence of an entity which may not exist
or which is far different from his tentative description of it.
If belief-in, or trusting, can be analyzed in terms of commitment to a course
of action or a disposition to act, then it seems that we do not need to believe-that
x exists in order to believe-in or deeply hope in the existence of x. We can live
in profound hope, trusting in the object of hope. In ordinary hope we may not
act according to the proposition in question, but may hedge our bet, as I have
indicated above. But in profound hope (and especially in desperate hope) the
desire for the object is so great that the subject is ready to act even in the light
of very little evidence or subjective probability that the object in question will
be realized. In such hope enormous risk is warranted by the strength of the desire
and the felt need. The person lives as if the proposition were true or would
become so. Columbus' sailors live on the hypothesis that the world is round,
even though they doubt it. The explorer hopes to find the Fountain of Youth,
even though he has doubts that such a fountain exists. A seriously sick woman
can act in desperation, writing to an unknown person (who may not exist) for
a wonder drug which in fact does not exist, but which she has heard about from
misinformed friends.
We can imagine a situation where Mary has merely heard a rumor about some
horse running in the Kentucky Derby at ridiculously low odds. She isn't sure
that she has the name right, but in despair she goes to the local bookmaker in
order to place her bet on Happy Dancer. She may doubt whether Happy Dancer
exists and doubts the ill-reputed bookmaker who assures her that there is such
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a horse (suppose that she has good grounds for her suspicions). We may, nevertheless, say that she trusts that there is, that she lives as if there is such a horse.
She lives in profound, desperate hope.
Genuinely living as ifmust be distinguished from pretending. You can pretend
and act as though you love your neighbors, for you may believe that it is good
policy to give this impression; but in genuinely profound hope the intentional
state is different from that of pretending.
Finally, we should examine the relationship between hoping and optimism.
If John hopes to marry Mary, must he be optimistic about this possibility? Can
we imagine John hopeful with regard to marrying her and still pessimistic about
its occurrence? We can imagine him hoping desperately, against hope, as it
were, and we can imagine an alternative between hope and despair (distinguishing
desperation from despair by the fact that despair tends to paralyze or cause
inaction, whereas desperation tends to cause action). If we mean by pessimistic
'a low estimation of the chances of realizing the state of affairs,' then we certainly
can be hopeful and pessimistic, but if we mean 'a psychological state of resigning
or despairing of realizing the state of affairs,' then we cannot be hopeful and
pessimistic. Resignation, despairing and fearing, as Day has shown, are all
contraries to hope. T think, in fact, the terms 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' are
ambiguous in this way, so that we may be able to conjoin pessimistic with
hopeful if we are emphasizing the estimative aspect of pessimism or optimism.
It is possible, then, to be a hopeful pessimist, while living as (f a proposition
were true. Indeed, one can live as if a proposition were true without hope, in a
desperate way, trusting, but not deeming the outcome significantly possible.
Profound hope, then, is a species offaith, but it is not identical with it. Normally,
however, the profound hoper will tend to envision the best outcome, even while
realizing the objective factors that count against it. He won't be dominated by
the objectively low probabilities of success.
We conclude, then, that hoping is distinguished from believing in that it
involves a strong volitional or affective aspect in a way believing does not and
that, as such, it is subject to moral assessment in a way that believing is not.
Hoping is desiderative, but is more inclined to action than mere wishing. Profound
hope is distinguished from ordinary hope by the intensity of the desire and
willingness to take great risk towards obtaining one's goal, and desperate hope
is a type of profound hope where the estimative aspect is low. Hope is not
identical with optimism, if optimism is defined as estimative. A hoper may see
that the odds are objectively against him and yet profoundly try to realize a state
of affairs. Nevertheless, in spite of the intensity of desire, the moral hoper will
continue to keep his mind open to fresh argument and evidence which could
either incline him towards belieful hope or abandoning one hope for another.
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III. Profound Hope and Religious Faith
Can we apply this analysis of profound hope to religious faith without loss?
Can we have religious faith in a religion like Christianity without believing that
the object of faith exists? Let me tell a story in order to have some data for our
analysis. Suppose Aaron and Moses both have an obligation to defend Israel
from the Canaanites, who are seen as a present danger. The question is whether
or not Israel should launch a preemptive strike against the neighboring tribe or
whether there is still room for negotiations. One morning Moses sincerely reports
that he has been appeared to by God, who has commanded him to annihilate
the Canaanites because of their wickedness and idolatry. He has no doubts about
the reality of the revelation, claims that it was self-authenticating, and tries to
convince Aaron to help him prepare for war. Aaron must make a decision whether
or not to support Moses, for he doubts whether God exists, let alone whether
he has revealed himself to his brother. However, he doubts these things only
weakly, deeming it possible that Yahweh exists and has so revealed himself to
Moses. He wonders at the clouds by day and the fire in the distance by night
which Moses claims are God's means of leading his people to their destination.
Aaron is agnostic about both the existence of Yahweh and the revelation to
Moses. Since he would like it to be the case that a benevolent guide for Israel
exists, he might be tempted to take William James's advice and get himself to
believe the requisite propositions by willing to believe them; but we may suppose
that he does not believe that volitional believing is possible for him or morally
acceptable. His only option is to live as if the proposition in question were true.
He assists Moses in every way in carrying out the campaign against the Canaanites. He proclaims the need for his people to fight against the enemy, and if he
sounds more convinced than he really is, he judges this deception to be justified.
True, he may not act out of spontaneous abandon as Moses does. On the other
hand, his scrupulous doubt may help him to notice problems and evidence which
might otherwise be neglected, to which the true believer is impervious. This
awareness may signal danger which may be avoided, thus saving the tribe from
disaster. Doubt may have as many virtues as belief, though they may be different
ones.
Moses and Aaron do not act out of entirely different noetic structures.
Moses entirely believes what Aaron only hopes for. Moses acts because he
believes that p and that it is a good thing that p. Aaron acts because he believes
that it would be a good thing if p, that p is possible and that it is rational and
morally permissible to hope that p. He exemplifies what we have called living
as if God exists and has revealed himself to Israel. He lives in profound hope
(and if he estimates the chances of God's existing to be very low, he also lives
in desperate hope). He identifies an ideal state of affairs, believes it to be possible,
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though not probable, and being a hopeful person, plumps for the better scenario,
rather than the worse. He lives experimentally with theism, in an experimental
faith in which he continues to keep his mind open to, and to search for, new
evidence which would either confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis on which his
hopeful faith is based. While the hoper may live in a deep or even desperate
hope, his eye, if he holds to an ethics of hope, is always on the evidence, so
that there may come a time when the available evidence (or his subjective
probability estimate) becomes too low to sustain faith.
My analysis suggests that the difference between faith and belief is more
radical than has usually been supposed. Usually, it is assumed that faith is a
special type of belief, one in which, in addition to belief in the existence of the
religious object, one trusts in it and allows its influence to dominate one's life.
To have faith in God is to believe that he exists and to commit one's life to him.
This seems to have New Testament backing, especially in the Epistle to the
Hebrews (chapter II), where we read that unless we believe that God exists,
we can neither come to God nor please him. However, as prominent as this view
has been in Western thought (note its presence in the quotation by Plantinga at
the beginning of this paper), I suggest that it is an illicit entailment and that the
writer of the letter to the Hebrews either had an overly behavioral interpretation
of belief or was engaging in religious rhetoric, for I see no good reason to
exclude the possibility of coming to God in hope rather than belief. On my
analysis one may alter the passage "Lord, I believe, help Thou my unbelief' to
read: "Lord, I hope in you; if you exist, please give me better evidence." To
believe that God exists is to believe that there is a being with certain necessary
properties such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence and being the
maker of heaven and earth. But to believe-in God implies only that one regards
such a being as possibly existing and that one is committed to live as if such a
being does exist. Whether it is rational to commit oneself in this way depends
on the outcome of an analysis of comparative values in relationship to probable
outcomes. It is the sort of assessment that goes on in any cost-benefit analysis.
It may usually be the case that those who believe in God also believe that
God exists, but there is no entailment between the two states. One might believe
that God exists without believing in God, and one might believe in God without
believing that God exists, either as an atheist (who finds the proposition 'God
exists' as genuinely possible and decides to live by it) or as an agnostic (who
finds the God-hypothesis worth living in accordance with). Often, it has been
supposed that there can be no hypothetical element in religious commitment and
that to treat God's existence as such is to violate the very essence of religious
faith. 14 Supposedly, the hypothetical stance is inadequate to produce the requisite
commitment and unreserved worship which religion demands. But if this is true
of traditional religious beliefs, I see no need to accept it as the only valid type
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of faith. An experimental faith that is open to new evidence is also an option.
In this regard, my analysis has in common with William James the notion of
theism being a live option (an hypothesis that is momentous and which the
subject sees as calling for a decision). It agrees with James that it would be a
good thing if theism and Christianity were true and can accept James's own
rejection of the necessity of sufficient evidence for the proposition that Christianity
is true before we can have faith. "If religion be true and the evidence for it be
still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting [the rationalist's] extinguisher upon
my nature ... to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side. "15
I would also agree with James against Pascal that there is a psychological aspect
to the decision of choosing religion which must supplement the merely calculative.
While an atheist (who does not rule out the possibility of God's existence) may
be persuaded of the logic of Pascal's Wager, he might not be moved by it. James
is right when he says that the hypothesis in question must be a psychologically
"live hypothesis." My analysis differs from James's in that I don't think it is
necessary to get oneself to believe that the hypothesis is true in order to choose
it in a profound way. One can have faith in God and Christianity without belief.
Aaron is just as much in faith as Moses. There are different types of faith.
Belief-that may be overrated in regard to explanatory hypotheses that involve
world views such as religions, political theories, and metaphysical systems. It
is important to come as close as possible to a fit between the best objective
evidence and the degree with which one believes propositions, but, admittedly,
this is a person-relative experience. My analysis presupposes that it makes sense
to speak of proportioning the strength of one's belief (which I separate from the
value of one's belief to the individual, the depth of ingress of the belief) to the
evidence, but it accepts intuitive beliefs as themselves prima facie evidence for
themselves and their entailments. Ultimately, if someone counts her intuitions
as evidence more than we do, all we can do is try to get her to see that she
really has counter-evidence or intuitions which should lessen the strength of her
apparent intuitive beliefs. There may be a more objective notion of proportioning
one's beliefs to the evidence, but my analysis is content with this weaker thesis.
It is possible that the belief that God exists is properly basic for some people,
but, by the same standard, it may be that the belief that the Devil is really God
is properly basic for others, given their noetic structure. For many of us neither
are properly basic.
If my analysis is correct, agnosticism and even an interested type of atheism
are possible religious positions. Doubt about God's existence, immortality, the
Incarnation, or the Trinity, though agonizing in the extreme at times, may be
necessary for some intellectually honest people. If there is an obligation to seek
to have true or justified beliefs, then what God desires is not sycophantic
struggling to get oneself to manipulate one's mind to believe what seems implaus-
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ible on a clear look at the evidence, but a doxastic morality that allows the mind
to be impartially shaped by the evidence.
If this is the case, then an interesting implication follows. Sometimes, as in
the Athanasian Creed or Evangelical theologies and sermons, religious people
have asserted that a beliefthat certain propositions are true is a necessary condition
for eternal salvation. We will be judged by whether or not we have believed
these propositions (e.g., those contained in the doctrine of the Trinity, the
Incarnation, and so forth). Pascal and others believed this so strongly that they
advocated that you should "pretend you believe" in order to get yourself to
believe what you don't believe by an impartial look at the evidence. But if we
have ethical duties to have the best justified beliefs possible in important matters,
and if those duties include a duty to acquire beliefs through impartial investigation
of the evidence, then it would seem that we cannot be judged unrighteous for
not believing in these propositions, if we justifiably find the evidence inadequate.
It would follow that there is a moral basis even to religious believing, so that a
moral God could not judge us merely on the basis of the beliefs we have. What
we can be judged for is how well we have responded to criticism of our beliefs,
including our religious beliefs, how faithful we have been to the truth as we
have seen it. On this basis it might well be the case that in heaven (or purgatory)
Calvin, Barth, Billy Graham and Jerry Falwell may have to be rehabilitated by
taking catechism lessons in the ethics of belief from such archangels as David
Hume and Bertrand Russell.
IV. Is Experimental Faith Adequate for Religious Belief!

In philosophical literature I know of only one serious set of objections to the
position that I have set forth. It has to do with the alleged inadequacy of any
sort of tentativeness or non-tenacity in religious believing. Experimental faith
lacks the ultimate commitment that is necessary for an adequate religious faith.
This objection is given its best expression by Gary Gutting in his incisive work
Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism, in which he distinguishes between
"interim assent" and "decisive assent." Decisive assent terminates the process
of inquiry into the truth of the core propositions, whereas interim assent keeps
the inquiry going. 16 In decisive assent one ends the search for justifying reasons
and becomes wholly concerned with understanding the implications of what one
believes. In interim assent one accepts the propositions in question without
terminating the search for their truth. While there may be a difference between
Gutting's notion of interim assent and what I have been calling experimental
faith or hopeful commitment,-the former but not the latter presupposing, at
least, weak belief-much of his attack on interim assent is applicable to my
account. On Gutting's account such faith is inadequate for religious life.
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Essentially, interim assent is inadequate for genuine religious belief because
of the way religious belief functions in the life of the believer. Gutting gives
three reasons for thinking that religious faith demands decisive assent and prohibits interim assent. (1) Religious belief is a (relative) end of a quest for
"emotional and intellectual satisfaction." "Any religious belief worthy of the
name must surely call for and legitimate a longing for God as the all-dominative
longing of the believer's life, the believer's 'master passion.' By contrast, the
life of a believer who gave only interim assent to God's reality ... could be rightly
dominated not by the longing for God but, at best, only by the longing to know
whether or not God exists."'7 (2) Religious belief requires total commitment to
the implications of what is believed and this is incompatible with continuing
reflection on its truth. Believers must often make fundamental sacrifices, which
only decisive assent would allow. (3) Merely interim assent is inconsistent with
the typically religious attitude toward nonbelief, which sees nonbelief as intrinsically bad. Interim assent has not the singlemindedness of decisive assent and
cannot "proclaim the ideal of its belief as 'the one thing needful.' "18
My first reaction to Gutting's insistence that decisive faith is a necessary
condition for adequate religious belief is to say that perhaps there is something
morally repugnant about "adequate" religious belief, since it seems to demand
a premature closure of inquiry. If there were good objective grounds for theism,
the mandate might be understandable. Since there doesn't seem to be that kind
of requisite evidence, the closure seems unwarranted. Even if experimental faith
failed to give what Gutting deems the necessary conditions for adequate religious
belief, this doesn't mean that experimental faith is a less valid position. It might
mean that traditional religious belief is not the only meaningful possibility for
intelligent persons. Perhaps traditionally necessary conditions.are not the necessary conditions that we would want to use to define an adequate faith for today.
It might be the case, for example, that traditional religions have under-emphasized
the role of an ethics of belief and assumed that a rigid set of beliefs was necessary
for genuine faith. If my analysis is correct, too much emphasis may have been
placed on credal affirmation in the past.
Gutting's analysis of the inferiority of interim assent has other problems.
Regarding his first point that "any religious belief worthy of the name must
surely call for and legitimate a longing for God as the all dominating longing
of the believer's life" and that interim assent fails here, we may demur at two
points. (a) Not every religion makes this longing the dominant passion. Buddhism
doesn't. Neither does Sikhism or Quakerism. On what independent grounds does
Gutting exclude these religions as "worthy religious beliefs," except by begging
the question? (b) Even if Gutting is right, however, I see no reason for concluding
that the person who hopes in God cannot be dominated by this passion, even
while questing for truth. To have faith in God, in the sense I have described, is
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to long for God passionately, to live as if God exists. But why is this incompatible
with seeking the best evidence on the matter, of admitting that one only weakly
believes this (or is agnostic on the matter)? Doesn't the believing Biblical scholar
have to inquire impartially into the evidence for important events upon which
faith is based? I think that it is a rather narrow notion of "passionate longing"
which rules out impartial inquiry. The hoper in God worships with passion and
commitment; only he or she acknowledges and is committed to doxastic integrity,
to continuing the dialogue with those who differ, and regards engaging in the
dialogue as one aspect of worship. Otherwise, how is it possible for the person
of faith to find honest "intellectual satisfaction," which Gutting acknowledges
as a necessary condition for adequate religion?
Gutting's second criticism of interim assent is that it precludes the sort of
unconditional commitment necessary for decisive action and fundamental sacrifices. It is true, as our discussion of Peirce and our parable of Aaron and Moses
show, that the doubter's steps are tripped by obstacles over which the true
believer hurdles with the greatest of ease. The question is whether this sort of
commitment is of the essence of genuine religion. The same imperviousness to
difficulty has led to some of the greatest intolerance and fanaticism the world
has known. We can rightly spot it as evil in fanatical Nazis or Shiite Moslems
following the Ayatolah Khoumeni, but we sometimes miss it in ourselves. Gutting
may have in mind the martyrs who are willing to die for belief in the Incarnation
or the existence of God, and perhaps the hoper in God will not be as willing to
die as the believer. But the hoper in God may, nevertheless, be willing to live
and die for the moral principles with he sees tied up with the essence of the
religious faith and which express much of the importance of believing in God
in the first place. The hoper in God may question whether we have any reason
to believe that a morally adequate religion or God's will demands that people
give their lives for the proposition that God exists. If God is all-powerful and
benevolent, surely, he could insure that the witness to his existence is not lost.
The third criticism that Gutting makes of interim assent is that it does not
allow for the deep conviction that belief in God is the "one thing needful," that
it is an unspeakably sad thing not to believe that God exists. Gutting is saying
that it is the relationship with God, trust in Him, that is needful, but he implies
that this entails believing that God exists. "For the believer, the world would be
a better place if everyone could see his way to accepting the believer's faith,"
but interim assent must allow "equal value" to opposing beliefs, an essential
element in continuing discussion. But this objection misses the point that the
manner of holding a belief may be as important as the belief itself. If everyone
in the world came to believe that God existed by manipulating their minds, it
might well tum out that these belief states were disconnected from the rest of
their noetic structure and represented a deep character flaw. It is not clear that
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honest doubt is less a state of reverence for God than fearful prohibition of doubt.
Gutting and I agree that belief in God can make a profound difference in the
way we live and that theism, which is at the basis of Judaism and Christianity,
is greatly inspiring and can motivate to high moral action. My point is that one
need not be a full-fledged believer that God exists in order to draw inspiration
from this insight. One can live imaginatively in hope, letting the thought of the
possibility of a benevolent Being motivate one to a more dedicated and worshipful
moral life. 19
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